This paper evaluates the macroeconomic effects of the Eurosystem's expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP) under alternative strategies as regards (i) the unwinding of asset positions accumulated under the APP and (ii) communication of current and future paths of the policy rate (forward guidance). To this purpose, we simulate a New Keynesian model of the euro area. Our results are as follows. First, as the monetary authority brings forward the selling of long-term sovereign bonds, the stimulus from the APP on inflation and economic activity is correspondingly reduced. In particular, if the bonds are sold immediately after purchases end, the impact on inflation is negligible. Second, if the monetary authority communicates that it will hold the policy rate constant for one year instead of two, the APP is less effective, and the inflation increase is halved. Third, the subdued impact of the APP associated with an early exit from the programme delays the return to a standard monetary policy regime. JEL Classification: E43, E52, E58.
It is extremely difficult to appraise the effectiveness of a program all of whose parameters have been announced at the beginning of the program. But I regard it as significant with respect to the effectiveness of QE that the taper tantrum in 2013, apparently caused by a belief that the Fed was going to wind down its purchases sooner than expected, had a major effect on interest rates.
Vice Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board Stanley Fischer
The launch of the euro area Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP) has spurred a debate on the elements of its design (amounts of purchases, composition, and duration) that influence its effectiveness in stimulating the real economy and inflation.
On the one hand, some have emphasized the costs of an over-prolonged programme, which could fuel inflation and inflation expectations well above the definition of price stability, thus forcing the monetary authority to subsequently embrace a restrictive stance. On the other hand, others have stressed the macroeconomic costs of a programme that does not last for a sufficient amount of time (so called "early exit") and, thus, turns out to be insufficient to achieve the price stability objective. The risk is that this may result in reiterated implementation of (individually taken) too timid successive non-standard measures, which may end up being counterproductive, because the commitment to achieve price stability becomes less and less credible as time goes by.
In this paper we evaluate the APP effectiveness in relation with its announced duration and the possibility that the programme is exited too early, by simulating a three-region New Keynesian model of the euro area (EA) and the world economy. The EA is formalized as a monetary union of two regions, Home and rest of the EA (REA), where Home is of medium size (its GDP is around 20% of overall EA GDP). The model includes a third region outside the EA, which represents the 1 See Fischer (2016) . 2 We thank for useful comments Martina Cecioni, Giuseppe Grande, Stefano Siviero and participants at the Bank of Italy Workshop "Unconventional monetary policy: effectiveness and risks" . The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect views of the Bank of Italy. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.
rest of the world (RW). The presence of the latter region makes it possible to take into account the role of the nominal exchange rate and extra-EA trade for the transmission of the monetary stimulus to the real economy.
Crucially, we relax the so called "Wallace neutrality", and make short-and long-term sovereign bonds imperfect substitute. In this way, the central bank purchases of long-term sovereign bonds do affect the consumption-saving decisions of households and firms. Specifically, we follow Chen, Cúrdia, and Ferrero (2012) , and introduce a preferred habitat assumption in the otherwise standard New Keynesian open economy framework. In each EA region some households (labeled as "restricted") have access only to long-term sovereign bonds and, indirectly, invest in physical capital accumulation, as they hold a constant (parametric) share of domestic "capital producers." The purchase of long-term government bonds by the monetary authority reduces long-term interest rates and induces restricted households to increase consumption and investment via the standard intertemporal substitution effect. The reduction in the long-term nominal interest rate leads to an increase in inflation expectations, which in turn reinforces the expansionary effect on aggregate demand and contributes to further reduce the real interest rate.
We simulate the following scenarios.
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First ("benchmark" case), we simulate the EA APP. The shock is calibrated so that it corresponds to overall quarterly purchases of euro 180 billion, that last for seven quarters. It is assumed that long-term sovereign bonds are held to maturity (on average 8 years) and, thereafter, the obtained principal payments are reinvested anew in long-term sovereign bonds as soon as they mature, for a period of 5 years.
Subsequently, the central bank starts to gradually sell the bonds.
Second, we simulate the effects of three alternative scenarios of "early exit from sovereign bond holdings:" in one case, the principal payments are reinvested for one year only; in the alternative cases, there is no reinvestment, as the central bank starts to gradually sell the bonds before they mature, i.e. either immediately or four years after the last quarter in which the purchases are made. In all (benchmark and "early exit from sovereign bond holdings") scenarios we assume that the monetary authority commits to keeping the short-term policy rate at its baseline level (0.25%) during the first two years of the simulations (we call it "Forward Guidance", FG henceforth).
Third, we explore the consequences of assuming that the same purchases are carried out as in the benchmark scenario but the short-term rate is kept at the baseline for one year instead of two. This scenario can be considered as a case of "early exit from FG."
Fourth, we assume a negative demand shock that endogenously drives the EA monetary policy rate to the zero lower bound (ZLB). On top of this shock, we simulate the APP under alternative assumptions in terms of sovereign bond reinvestment. In this scenario, there is no FG, as the monetary policy rate is set according to a standard Taylor rule and is constrained by the ZLB (the monetary authority would further decrease the rate in the absence of the ZLB).
Our results are as follows. First, if the monetary authority brings forward the unwinding of its long-term sovereign bond holdings, the stimulus from the APP on inflation and economic activity is correspondingly reduced. If the bonds are immediately sold after the end of the purchases, the impact on inflation is negligible. If the bonds are held to maturity (8 year on average) or reinvested, the annualized increase in inflation is 0.8 percentage points (pp) at the peak, in about five quarters.
Second, if the monetary authority communicates that the policy rate will be held constant for a shorter period of time, the APP is less effective in stimulating inflation. If the FG lasts 1 year instead of 2, inflation increases by 0.3pp instead of 0.8pp (in about five quarters). Third, an early exit from bond holdings strongly hampers the effectiveness of the programme in creating macroeconomic conditions conducive to the short-term policy rate being raised above the ZLB. The normalization of monetary policy conditions is therefore delayed.
The paper builds upon several recent contributions. Burlon, Gerali, Notarpietro, and Pisani (2015) evaluate the impact of the APP on EA macroeconomic and financial conditions assuming that some households are subject to a borrowing constraint. Chen, Cúrdia, and Ferrero (2012) introduce financial market segmentatioǹ a la Andrés, López-Salido, and Nelson (2004) to evaluate the impact of US quan-titative easing. We tailor their set-up to a monetary union framework. Previous studies, on the US, as Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) , and Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) study the effects of security purchase programs in closed-economy settings. Our exercise is calibrated to the EA.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of the model and the details of the calibration. Section 3 reports the main results. Section 4 concludes.
The model
We first provide an overview of the model. Subsequently, we illustrate the crucial features for the simulations (borrowing constraint and long-term sovereign bond market). Finally, we report the calibration.
Overview
The model represents a world economy composed of three regions, that is, Home, REA (Home+REA=EA), and RW. The size of the world economy is normalized to one. Home, REA, and RW have sizes equal to n, n * , and (1 − n − n * ), with n > 0, n * > 0, and n + n * < 1. For each region, size refers to the overall population, to the number of firms operating in each sector and, in the case of each EA region, the number of capital producers. Home and REA share the currency and the monetary authority. The latter sets the policy rate according to EA-wide variables (a standard Taylor rule holds) when it does not deliberately enact FG or when it is not constrained by the ZLB. The presence of the RW outside the EA allows to assess the role of the nominal exchange rate and extra-EA trade for the transmission of the APP.
We introduce financial segmentationà la Chen, Cúrdia, and Ferrero (2012) , which allows the APP to have real effects in our model. In each EA region there are two types of households, restricted and unrestricted.
The restricted households have access only to the domestic long-term sovereign bond market and, indirectly, invest in physical capital accumulation, as they hold a constant (parametric) share of domestic "capital producers."
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The unrestricted households (1) have access to the domestic short-term private bond and long-term sovereign bond markets, (2) trade a riskless private bond with RW households, and (3) invest in physical capital, as, similarly to the restricted households, they hold a constant share of domestic capital producers.
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The latter accumulate physical capital by demanding final investment goods subject to quadratic adjustment costs on investment change (so a Tobin's Q holds).
They rent capital to domestic firms producing intermediate goods. They maximize profits with respect to capital and investment taking prices as given, and evaluate returns according to a weighted (according the corresponding shares) average of unrestricted and restricted households' stochastic discount factors. The (net) revenues are rebated in a lump-sum way to domestic unrestricted and restricted households, according to their corresponding shares. On the production side, there are perfectly competitive firms that produce two final goods (consumption and investment goods) and monopolistic firms that produce intermediate goods (firms are owned by domestic unrestricted households). The two final goods are sold domestically and are produced combining all available intermediate goods using a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production function. The two resulting bundles can have different composition. Intermediate tradable and non-tradable goods are produced combining domestic capital and labor, that are assumed to be mobile across sectors. Intermediate tradable goods can be sold domestically and abroad. Because intermediate goods are differentiated, firms have market power and restrict output to create excess profits. We also assume that markets for tradable goods are segmented, so that firms can set 4 The assumed financial market structure allows us to have meaningful EA net foreign asset position and trade balance. An international market for at least one euro-denominated sovereign bond allows for a further channel of transmission of the APP to the EA/RW exchange rate.
5 For details, see Chen, Cúrdia, and Ferrero (2012 
Restricted households
There exists a continuum of mass 0 ≤ λ R ≤ 1 of restricted households, indexed by j ′ , with j ′ ǫ (0, nλ R ]. Their preferences are additively separable in consumption and labor effort. The generic restricted household j receives utility from consumption C R (j ′ ) and disutility from labor L R (j ′ ). Following common practice in the New Keynesian literature, the assumption of cashless economy holds in the model. The expected lifetime utility of the generic restricted household j′ is
where E 0 denotes the expectation conditional on information set at date 0, β R is the discount factor (0 < β R < 1), 1/σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (σ > 0), and 1/τ is the labor Frisch elasticity (τ > 0). The parameter h (0 < h < 1)
represents external habit formation in consumption. They have access only to the market of long-term sovereign bonds. The budget constraint is
= ωΠ
where B L R,t is the amount of long-term sovereign bonds. The variable R L t is the gross yield to maturity at time t on the long-term bond
The variable Π prof t is the Home capital producers' aggregate profit. Each individual restricted household gets profits from ownership of domestic capital producers, according to the constant (parametric) share 0 < ω < 1. The long-term sovereign bonds are formalized as perpetuities paying an exponentially decaying coupon κ ∈ (0, 1], following Woodford (2001) . Finally, households act as wage setters in a monopolistic competitive labor market. Each household j ′ supplies one particular type of labor services, which is an imperfect substitute to services supplied by other households. It sets its nominal wage taking into account labor demand and quadratic adjustment costs AC W Rà la Rotemberg on the nominal wage W R (j ′ ):
where κ W > 0 and 0
is the wage inflation rate, andΠ EA is the long-run inflation target of the EA monetary authority (assumed to be constant). The adjustment costs are proportional to the per-capita wage bill of restricted households, W R,t L R,t .
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Restricted households are crucial for the APP to have real effects in our model. As they cannot make arbitrage between short-term and long-term bonds, the socalled Wallace neutrality is relaxed, and short-and long-term sovereign bonds are not perfect substitutes for households. Thus, long-term sovereign bond prices and yields do matter for households consumption and saving decisions. The monetary policy authority can affect them by directly intervening in the long-term sovereign bond market (to change the long-term interest rate).
Unrestricted households
There exists a continuum of unrestricted households, indexed by j, with j ǫ (nλ R , n]. These households have the same preferences as restricted households, thus they consume and supply labor. The only difference is the discount factor, β U , which is different from that of restricted households (β U > β R ).
Home unrestricted households have access to multiple financial assets (all denominated in euro terms): the short-term sovereign bond, B G , exchanged with the domestic government and paying the interest rate R G ; the short-term private bond, B P , exchanged with REA unrestricted and RW households and paying the EA monetary policy rate R; the long-term sovereign bond, B L U , exchanged with the domestic restricted households, domestic government and, because of the APP, the EA monetary authority. Thus, they have several opportunities to smooth consumption when facing a shock. The budget constraint of the generic unrestricted household j is
The term φ t represents an exponential adjustment costs, needed to stabilize the position in the short-term private bond. 9 The term AC B U,t is an adjustment cost 9 The adjustment cost is defined as
on long-term sovereign bond holdings.
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The term (1 − ω) represents the constant (parametric) share, assumed to be the same across unrestricted households, of domestic capital producers' aggregate profits. Unrestricted households own all domestic firms. The variable Π P t (j) stands for dividends from ownership of domestic monopolistic firms (claims to firms' profits are not internationally tradable). The term T AX t > 0 represents lump-sum taxes. The unrestricted households supply labor services under monopolistic competition, and face quadratic adjustment costs AC W U,t when setting nominal wages (the cost is similar to the one paid by restricted households, see eq. 3).
First order conditions imply no-arbitrage conditions for the unrestricted households.
11 Thus, in equilibrium the interest rates paid by the different bonds are equal to the monetary policy rate R t , except for the spreads induced by the longer maturity and the adjustment costs. 
Capital producers
There exists a continuum of mass 0 ≤ n ≤ 1 of firms e that produce physical capital. They optimally choose capital K t and investment I t to maximize profits subject to the law of capital accumulation, the adjustment costs on investment, and taking prices as given. The law of motion of capital accumulation is
whereB P is the steady-state position of the representative Home unrestricted household. The adjustment cost is taken as given in the maximization problem. A similar cost holds for the representative RW household. 10 We assume a standard quadratic form for the adjustment cost, that is,
whereP LBL U is the (symmetric) steady-state value of the long-term sovereign bond. The adjustment cost guarantees that the bond holdings follow a stationary process and that the economy converges to the steady state.
11 As the implied first order conditions are rather standard we do not report them to save on space. They are available upon request.
12 See Chen, Cúrdia, and Ferrero (2012) for the details. Our calibration implies that households can modify their financial positions without facing relevant adjustment costs.
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where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate. The adjustment cost on investment AC
Capital produces rent existing physical capital stock K t−1 (e) at the nominal rate R K t to domestic firms producing intermediate tradable and non-tradable goods. Investment is a final non-tradable good, composed of intermediate (domestic and imported) tradable and non-tradable goods. Capital producers buy it in the corresponding market at price P I . 13 Because of the adjustment costs on investment, a "Tobin's Q" holds. When maximizing profits with respect to capital and investment, capital producers discount profits using the stochastic discount rate of restricted and unrestricted households, aggregated according to the corresponding shares.
Monetary policy
In almost all scenarios we assume that the monetary authority enacts the FG, i.e., it commits to keeping the short-term policy rate at its baseline level (0.25%) during the first two years of the simulations. In some scenarios it is assumed, instead, that the ZLB is an endogenous constraint on the policy rate, as the EA central bank, in the aftermath of a recessionary shock, cannot further reduce the rate, beyond the zero level. When neither the FG nor the ZLB hold, a standard Taylor rule kicks in to set the policy rate,
where R t is the gross monetary policy rate. The parameter ρ R (0 < ρ R < 1) captures inertia in interest rate setting, while the parameterR represents the steadystate gross nominal policy rate. The parameters ρ π and ρ GDP are respectively the weights of EA consumer price index (CPI) inflation rate (Π EA,t ) (taken as a deviation from its long-run constant targetΠ EA ) and GDP (GDP EA,t ). 14 When the policy rate exits from the ZLB, it reverts to the Taylor rule. 
Fiscal authority
Fiscal policy is set at the regional level. The Home government budget constraint is
where B S g,t ≥ 0 and B L g,t ≥ 0 are respectively the short-and long-term nominal sovereign debt. The variable C g t represents government purchases of goods and services. Consistent with the empirical evidence, C g t is fully biased towards the intermediate non-tradable good. Hence it is multiplied by the corresponding price index P N,t .
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The government follows a fiscal rule defined on lump-sum taxes. This rule aims at bringing the short-term public debt b 
where parameters φ 1 , φ 2 > 0 call for an increase in lump-sum taxes whenever the short-term debt level is above target and for a larger increase whenever its dynamics is not converging. A similar rule holds in the REA. We include only 14 The CPI inflation rate is a geometric average of Home and REA CPI inflation rates (respectively Π t and Π * t ) with weight equal to the correspondent country GDP (as a share of the EA GDP). The EA GDP, GDP EA,t , is the sum of Home and REA GDPs. 15 We implement the ZLB by simulating the fully non-linear model under perfect foresight and specify equation (6) using the "max" operator.
16 See Corsetti and Mueller (2006) .
the short-term debt in the fiscal rule for two reasons. First, we hold the supply of long-term government bonds, B L g,t , fixed so as to isolate the direct demand effects of the APP. Second, we need the fiscal rule to stabilize the short-term debt and, as we assume that the long-term component is exogenous, the overall public debt. In the RW, as there is no distinction between short-and long-term domestic sovereign bonds, the rule holds for the overall public debt.
Finally, lump-sum taxes are paid by unrestricted households only. In this way we are able to isolate the response of restricted and indebted households to the APP from the indirect fiscal adjustments implied by the program. 
Bonds market clearing conditions
The market clearing condition for the Home long-term government bond is
where the variable B L AP P,t represents the demand for long-term sovereign bonds by the EA monetary authority.
The market clearing condition for the Home short-term sovereign bond is
as the short-term sovereign bond is held only by unrestricted households. Similar equations hold in the REA.
18
17 The Ricardian equivalence does not hold, since Restricted households hold long-term sovereign bonds but are not subject to lump-sum taxes.Our assumption on the distribution of lump-sum taxes or, equivalently, on the initial distribution of public debt, implies that sovereign bond holdings are net wealth.
18 In particular, the market clearing condition for the REA long-term government bond is
where the variables
, and B L * AP P,t represent the demand for REA long-term sovereign bonds by the REA restricted households, REA unrestricted households, and EA monetary authority, respectively.
Equilibrium
In each country initial asset positions, preferences, and budget constraints are the same for households belonging to the same type and firms belonging to the same sector. Moreover, profits from ownership of domestic firms acting under monopolistic competition are equally shared across unrestricted households. Profits from ownership of domestic capital producers are distributed to restricted and unrestricted households according to the corresponding shares held by each type of households, and are equally shared within each type. Thus, there is the representative household for each household type (restricted, and unrestricted), the representative firm for each sector (final non-tradable, intermediate tradable, and intermediate non-tradable), and the representative capital producer. The implied symmetric equilibrium is a sequence of allocations and prices such that, given initial conditions and considered shocks, households and firms satisfy their corresponding first order conditions, the Taylor rules, the fiscal rules, and the government budget constraints hold, and all markets clear.
Calibration
The model is calibrated at quarterly frequency. We set some parameter values so that steady-state ratios are consistent with average EA 2014 national account data, which are the most recent and complete available data. For remaining parameters we resort to previous studies and estimates available in the literature. Table 1 contains parameters for preferences and technology. Parameters with " * " and " * * " are related to the REA and the RW, respectively. We assume perfect symmetry between the REA and the RW unless differently specified. The discount factor of EA unrestricted households is set to 0.9994, so that the steady-state shortterm interest rate is equal to 0.24% on an annual basis. The discount factor of RW households is also set to 0.9994. The discount factor of restricted households determines the steady-state value of the long-term interest rate and is set to 0.995, so that in steady state the spread between short-and long-term bond is equal to 1.8pp. In each EA region the share of restricted households is set to 0.25. Given the lack of micro-evidence on this share, we set it to get a response of investment to the (benchmark) APP around four times as large as the response of consumption, in line with standard business cycle facts on response of investment, which is larger than that of consumption.
The value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σ, is 1. The Frisch labor elasticity is set to 0.5. Habit is set to 0.8. The depreciation rate of capital is set to 0.025.
In the production functions of tradables and non-tradables, the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is set to 0.90. To match investment-to-GDP ratios, the bias towards capital in the production function of tradables is set to 0.56 in Home and, in the REA and in the RW, to 0.46. The corresponding value in the production function of non-tradables is set to 0.53 in Home and 0.43 in the REA and RW. In the final consumption and investment goods the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported tradable is set to 1.5, while the elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables is set to 0.5, as empirical evidence suggests that it is harder to substitute tradables for nontradables than to substitute across tradables. The biases towards the domestically produced good and composite tradable good are chosen to match the Home and REA import-to-GDP ratios. In the consumption bundle the bias towards the domestic tradable is 0.68 in Home, 0.59 in the REA, and 0.90 in the RW. The bias towards the composite tradable is set to 0.68 in Home and to 0.50 in the REA and the RW. For the investment basket, the bias towards the domestic tradable is 0.50 in Home, 0.49 in the REA, and 0.90 in the RW. The bias towards the composite tradable is 0.78 in Home and 0.70 in the REA and in the RW. Table 2 reports gross mark-up values. In the Home tradable and non-tradable sectors and in the Home labor market the mark-up is set to 1.08, 1.29, and 1.60, respectively (the corresponding elasticities of substitution across varieties are set to 13.32, 4.44, and 2.65). In the REA tradable and non-tradable sectors and in the REA labor market the gross mark-ups are respectively set to 1.11, 1.24, and 1.33 (the corresponding elasticities are set to 10.15, 5.19, and 4.00) . Similar values are chosen for the corresponding parameters in the RW. Table 3 contains parameters that regulate the dynamics. Adjustment costs on investment change are set to 7.5. Nominal wage quadratic adjustment costs are set to 400. In the tradable sector, we set the nominal adjustment cost parameter to 400 for Home tradable goods sold domestically and in the REA; for Home goods sold in the RW, the corresponding parameter is set to 50. The same parameterization is adopted for the REA, while for the RW we set the adjustment cost on goods exported to Home and the REA to 50. Nominal price adjustment costs are set to 600 in the non-tradable sector.
The parameter regulating the adjustment costs paid by the unrestricted household on deviations of long-term sovereign bond positions from steady-state levels, φ b L , is set to 0.000067 and to 0.00047 in Home and REA, respectively. The parameters regulating the adjustment cost on private bond position, paid by Home unrestricted households and RW households, are set to 0.0015 and 0.003. These parameters have been calibrated following two criteria. First, they should not greatly affect the model dynamics and yet help to stabilize it. Second, the response of the interest rate on long-term sovereign bonds to the benchmark APP should be in line with existing evidence for the EA. Table 4 reports the parametrization of the systematic feedback rules followed by the fiscal and monetary authorities. In the fiscal policy rule (8) we set φ 1 = 0.05 and φ 2 = 10.01 for Home, and φ 1 = φ 2 = 1.01 for the REA and the RW. It is always lump-sum transfers to adjust. The central bank of the EA targets the contemporaneous EA-wide consumer price inflation (the corresponding parameter is set to 1.7) and the output growth (the parameter is set to 0.1). Interest rate is set in an inertial way and hence its previous-period value enters the rule with a weight equal to 0.92. The values are identical for the corresponding parameters of the Taylor rule in the RW. Table 5 reports the great ratios, which are matched by the model steady state under our baseline calibration. We assume a zero steady-state net foreign asset position of each region. The sizes of Home and REA GDPs as shares of world GDP are set to 4% and to 18%, respectively. So the Home GDP is around 20% of EA GDP.
Short-term public debt (ratio to yearly GDP) is set to 13% for Home and 8% for the REA. Long-term public debt is set to 121% and 93% of (yearly) GDP for Home and the REA. We assume that in each country long-term sovereign bond holdings 20 See Altavilla, Carboni and Motto (2015) .
are equally shared between unrestricted and restricted households. The parameter κ is calibrated to match the average duration of the representative long-term EA sovereign bond, which is equal to 8 years.
Variables of the RW are set to values equal to those of corresponding REA variables.
The chosen calibration yields impulse response functions to a standard monetary policy shock (+0.25 basis points) for GDP and inflation in each EA region that are in line with the workhorse estimated models of the EA in the literature.
3 Results
We initially describe the simulated scenarios, and, subsequently, we report the results.
Simulated scenarios
First ("benchmark" case), we simulate the EA APP. The shock is calibrated so that it corresponds to overall quarterly purchases of euro 180 billion, that last for seven quarters. It is assumed that long-term sovereign bonds are held to maturity (on average 8 years) and, thereafter, the obtained principal payments are reinvested anew in long-term sovereign bonds as soon as they mature, for a period of 5 years. Subsequently, the central bank starts to gradually sell the bonds. Second, we simulate the effects of three alternative scenarios of "early exit from sovereign bond holdings:" in one case, the principal payments are reinvested for one year only; in the alternative cases, there is no reinvestment, as the central bank starts to gradually sell the bonds before they mature, i.e. either immediately or four years after the last quarter in which the purchases are made. In all (benchmark and "early exit from bond holdings") scenarios we assume that the monetary authority commits to keeping the short-term policy rate at its baseline level (0.25%) during the first two years of the simulations (we call it "Forward Guidance", FG henceforth). 
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In Section 3.2, we report results of the benchmark case, corresponding to the simulation of the APP. The shock is calibrated so that it corresponds to overall quarterly purchases of euro 180 billion, that last for seven quarters. Home and REA long-term sovereign bond purchases are proportional to the size of the corresponding region (measured as a share of EA GDP). It is assumed that long-term sovereign bonds are held to maturity (on average 8 years) and, thereafter, the obtained principal payments are reinvested anew in long-term sovereign bonds as soon as they mature, for a period of 5 years. Subsequently, the central bank starts to gradually sell the bonds. The benchmark scenario is compared with three alternative scenarios of "early exit from sovereign bond holdings:" in one case, the principal payments are reinvested for one year only; in the alternative cases, there is no reinvestment, as the central bank starts to gradually sell the bonds before they mature, i.e. either immediately or four years after the last quarter in which the purchases are made. In all (benchmark and "early exit from bond holdings") scenarios we assume that the monetary authority commits to keeping the short-term policy rate at its baseline level (0.25%) during the first two years of the simulations (FG).
In Section 3.3, we explore the consequences of assuming that the same purchases are carried out as in the benchmark scenario but the short-term rate is kept at the baseline for one year instead of two. This scenario can be considered as a case of "early exit from FG."
Fourth, in Section 3.4, we assume a EA-wide negative demand shock that endogenously drives the EA monetary policy rate, set according to the Taylor rule 21 (eq. 6), to the zero lower bound (ZLB). On top of this shock, we simulate the APP under alternative assumptions in terms of sovereign bond reinvestment. In this scenario, there is no FG, as the monetary policy rate is set according to a standard Taylor rule and is constrained by the ZLB (the monetary authority would further decrease the rate in the absence of the ZLB). In this way, we assess the impact of APP on the normalization of monetary policy conditions (endogenous exit of the policy rate from the ZLB).
All scenarios are simulated under perfect foresight. Households and firms are surprised by the shock in the first period and fully anticipate shocks perturbing the economy in subsequent periods. Figure 1 shows results for the benchmark case (5 year-reinvestment and 2 year-FG). Economic activity and the inflation rate increase in both EA regions. The effects are rather symmetric across the two regions. Inflation gradually increases, by about 0.8pp (annualized) after five quarters. Thereafter, it gradually decreases. GDP increases by around 1.0% (peak level) after five quarters.
Early exit from bond holdings
Home and REA consumption and investment benefit from the reduction in the long-term interest rate. Consumption is also affected by the intertemporal substitution effect, associated with the lower short-term real interest rate that positively affects unrestricted households. The real interest rate decreases because inflation increases, while the (nominal) monetary policy rate is kept constant at the baseline level by the monetary authority.
Consistent with the rise in production, labor effort and (not reported) real wages increase. Exports increase because the euro depreciates in nominal terms, making goods produced in the EA more competitive. Moreover, as each EA region is the main trade partner of the other, the increase in aggregate demand favors the increase in intra-EA exports and imports. Figure 2 compares the benchmark scenario with others characterized by alternative early exits from long-term sovereign bond holdings. We report variables for the aggregate EA, as Home and REA responses are rather similar. panel shows the sovereign bond purchases. The black solid line represents the case of 5-year reinvestment (benchmark), the red dashed line the 1-year reinvestment, the green crossed and the blue solid lines represent two cases of no reinvestment, as the gradual exit starts 4 years after the end of purchases (exit after 4 years) or immediately after the end of purchases (immediate exit).
As shown in the second panel from the top, the earlier the exit from reinvestment, the lower and less persistent the decrease in the long-term interest rate. In the case of early exit, the central bank sustains bond demand for a relatively short amount of time. Thus, the price of the bond, which reflects current and future demand (of the bond), increases to a small extent; correspondingly, the long-term interest rate decreases to a small extent. In particular, the interest rate reduction is rather small in the "immediate exit" case. The responses of EA CPI inflation and GDP (two bottom panels) are consistent with those of the long-term interest rates. The earlier the exit, the less pronounced is the increase in inflation and economic activity. Specifically, we do not find noticeable differences in the short-and medium-run effects of the 5-year and 1-year reinvestment cases. More crucially, the exit after 4 years reduces the (peak) effect on inflation and GDP to roughly 0.3% and 0.8%, respectively. Finally, the immediate exit is the worst scenario in terms of favoring inflation and economic activity, as both increase in a rather modest, almost negligible, way.
Early exit from FG
In the simulations previously reported the monetary authority announces in the initial period that it will keep the short-term policy rate at the baseline level during the first two years. We now assess the role of this commitment by changing, relative to the benchmark scenario, the announced number of periods during which the policy rate is kept constant. Specifically, in the alternative scenario, we consider one year. Figure 3 reports the results. In both scenarios, the policy rate increases after the end of the commitment period. The central bank returns to follow the Taylor rule and therefore increases the policy rate (see top panel) to stabilize the macroeconomic conditions. The long-term interest rate (second panel from the top) does not greatly change across the two scenarios, because its dynamics largely reflects the purchases programme, which is identical across the two scenarios.
The earlier the exit from the FG, the lower the effects on inflation (third panel from the top). In particular, the increase in inflation in the case of 1-year FG is half the increase when the FG lasts for 2 years (benchmark case). The lower increase is due to the fact that unrestricted households anticipate the more rapid increase in the policy rate and, thus, increase their aggregate demand for consumption to a lower extent. This implies that firms increase demand for capital and the price of their goods relatively less. Overall, the lower increase in aggregate demand implies lower inflation and, as shown in the next-to-bottom panel, lower GDP growth in the first two years (at the peak, it is roughly half the growth obtained in the benchmark case).
Finally, the lower GDP growth when the FG lasts for fewer periods can be explained also in terms of lower (gross) exports (not reported to save on space) towards the RW. The more rapid increase in the EA policy rate reduces the differential with the RW interest rate and, through the uncovered interest parity condition, reduces the nominal exchange rate depreciation. The lower depreciation limits the price-competitiveness gain of the goods produced in the EA (and, thus, the increase in EA exports).
Bond holdings and restoring normal monetary policy conditions
We now assume that a EA negative aggregate demand (for consumption and investment) shock drives the EA short-term monetary policy rate from its baseline (0.25%) to the zero level, where it stays for one year.
23 Real GDP and, to a lower extent, inflation fall. In the attempt to stabilize the macroeconomic conditions, the EA central bank reduces the policy rate according to the Taylor rule (6) until the ZLB is achieved, making further policy rate reductions impossible. As soon as the shock fades out and inflation and economic activity return to increase, the central bank gradually rises the policy rate in accordance to the Taylor rule. On top of the negative aggregate demand shock, we implement again the sovereign bond purchases programme. However, in this case we do not assume FG, as we want to evaluate the relationship between early exit from bond holdings and impact of the programme on the (endogenous) duration of the ZLB constraint. We consider the benchmark version of the programme (5-year version) and the immediate-exit version (the central bank sells purchased bonds immediately after the end of the purchasing period). Figure 4 reports the results. In the case of the benchmark programme, the short-term monetary policy rate increases out of the ZLB after two quarters (red dashed line, top panel). In the immediate-exit case, the length of the ZLB is not reduced relative to the ZLB scenario (blue circled line and black solid line, respectively). The benchmark programme reduces the long-term interest rate relatively more than the extent implied by the immediate-exit programme. Thus, it has a larger stimulating effect on aggregate demand for consumption and investment. The expansion more than counterbalances the recessionary effect of the negative aggregate demand shock. Overall, EA consumption and investment decrease to a lower extent (not reported). Thus, GDP and inflation widely increase relative to the ZLB scenario. The inflation rate increases relative to the baseline level, inducing the EA central bank to enact an early rise in the short-term policy rate according to the Taylor rule. The immediate-exit version of the programme does not produce sufficiently expansionary effects on aggregate demand because of its limited impact on the long-term interest rate. Thus, economic activity and inflation do not greatly improve relative to the ZLB scenario and the central bank does not anticipate the increase in the monetary policy rate. As a result, the monetary policy regime does not return earlier to normality.
Conclusions
This paper addresses the relationship between effectiveness of the APP and the announcement of some main parameters, and in particular those that regulate the unwinding of purchases; the impact of FG is also explored. According to our results, the earlier the announced exit, the lower the effectiveness of the APP in both stimulating inflation and economic activity and, thus, in restoring a standard monetary policy regime.
Our work can be extended along several dimensions. First, we do not have considered the risks associated with an announcement of "too prolonged" measures that, for example, could fuel "excessive" asset price increases and, thus, jeopardize financial stability in some countries of the EA. This is the focus of a companion paper (see Burlon, Gerali, Notarpietro and Pisani 2016) . Second, all simulations are run under perfect foresight, an assumption which implies full credibility of the announcements. This assumption can be relaxed to allow for imperfect credibility. Under this alternative assumption it would become possible to assess the effectiveness of alternative APP set-ups not only in stimulating the economy but also in restoring full credibility. We leave this issue for future research. 
where firms in the Home intermediate tradable and non-tradable sectors are respectively indexed by h ∈ (0, n] and n ∈ (0, n], firms in the REA by g ∈ (n, n+n * ], and firms in the RW by f ∈ (n + n * , 1]. Parameters θ T , θ N > 1 are respectively the elasticity of substitution across brands in the tradable and non-tradable sector. The prices of the intermediate non-tradable goods are denoted p(i). Each firm x takes these prices as given when minimizing production costs of the final good.
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The resulting demand for intermediate non-tradable input i is Q A,t (i, x) = 1 s
where P N,t is the cost-minimizing price of one basket of local intermediates:
We can derive Q A (h, x), Q A (f, x), C g A (h, x), C g A (f, x), P H , and P F in a similar way. Firms y producing the final investment goods have similar demand curves.
Aggregating over x and y, it can be shown that total demand for intermediate non-tradable good i is 
Firm i uses labor L 
The productions of each Home tradable good, T S (h), is similarly characterized.
Price setting in the intermediate sector
Consider now profit maximization in the Home intermediate non-tradable sector.
Each firm i sets the price p t (i) by maximizing the present discounted value of profits subject to the demand constraint and the quadratic adjustment costs,
which is paid in unit of sectorial product Q N,t and where κ p N ≥ 0 measures the degree of price stickiness. The resulting first-order condition, expressed in terms of domestic consumption, is
where mc t (i) is the real marginal cost and A t (i) contains terms related to the presence of price adjustment costs:
The above equations clarify the link between imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. When the elasticity of substitution θ N is very large and hence the competition in the sector is high, prices closely follow marginal costs, even though adjustment costs are large. To the contrary, it may be optimal to maintain stable prices and accommodate changes in demand through supply adjustments when the average markup over marginal costs is relatively high. If prices were flexible, optimal pricing would collapse to the standard pricing rule of constant markup over marginal costs (expressed in units of domestic consumption):
A t (h) ≈ κ p H P t (h) P t−1 (h) 
where L (i, j) is the demand of the labor input of type j by the producer of good i and ψ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among labor inputs. Cost minimization implies that
where W (j) is the nominal wage of labor input j and the wage index W is
42 Similar equations hold for firms producing intermediate tradable goods. Each household is the monopolistic supplier of a labor input j and sets the nominal wage facing a downward-sloping demand obtained by aggregating demand across Home firms. The wage adjustment is sluggish because of quadratic costs paid in terms of the total wage bill,
where the parameter κ W > 0 measures the degree of nominal wage rigidity and L t is the total amount of labor in the Home economy.
